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On November 2 the Tennessee legislature
will convene a special session to debate reform
of the state tax system. The center of the contro-
versy is whether Tennessee should adopt a per-
sonal income tax, as proposed by Gov. Don
Sundquist, to close an estimated $400 million
budget shortfall.
This study finds that a personal income tax
in Tennessee would likely have two negative
economic effects. First, an income tax would
almost certainly reduce economic growth and
job creation in the state. The absence of an
income tax in Tennessee gives Tennessee a
large competitive advantage over other states
with which it competes for jobs and business-
es. We find, for example, that Kentucky, a state
very similar to Tennessee except that it has an
income tax, has had considerably weaker eco-
nomic performance since 1980. Between 1980
and 1998 the per capita economic growth rate
of Tennessee was 47 percent compared to 36
percent in Kentucky. 
The second negative effect of a state income
tax would be to trigger much faster growth in
state expenditures. That has been the almost
universal pattern in other states after they
enacted a state income tax. Yet the premise of
pro–income tax forces in Tennessee that the
state’s revenues have been growing too slowly
is contradicted by the evidence. In the 1990s,
even without an income tax, Tennessee’s per
capita tax receipts have grown 12th fastest
among the 50 states. Tennessee’s tax revenues
have climbed at twice the rate of inflation plus
population growth. The legislature should be
cutting taxes, not introducing new ones.
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Introduction
Tennessee is currently one of nine remain-
ing states without a personal income tax.1
That status may change later this year.
Tennessee’s Republican governor Don
Sundquist has called for a special session of
the state legislature to consider tax reform
alternatives. One objective of this special ses-
sion is to close a state budget shortfall esti-
mated at between $300 million and $500 mil-
lion. The longer-term objective is to totally
restructure the tax system in order to perma-
nently raise more tax revenues. Sundquist has
proposed a 3.75 percent personal income tax.
This proposal is also supported by many busi-
ness groups, the teachers union, and several
leading academics in the state.2
It is noteworthy that in running for reelec-
tion in 1998 Sundquist never even broached
the subject of an income tax with Tennessee
voters. In 1994 when he first ran for gover-
nor, he pledged “never” to support an income
tax.3 There is also serious debate as to
whether a state income tax would violate the
Tennessee Constitution. In 1932 in Evans v.
McCabe, the Tennessee Supreme Court held
that an income tax was unconstitutional,
though a 1981 Attorney General Opinion
suggests otherwise.4 Leading the charge
against the income tax have been the
Tennessee Family Institute and a number of
state taxpayer organizations.5 A recent poll
suggests that by about a three-to-one margin,
Tennessee residents are opposed to an
income tax.6
Supporters of a personal income tax make
three arguments in favor of this new tax.
First, they argue that the Tennessee tax sys-
tem is regressive, with a heavier share of the
tax burden borne by low-income residents
than in most other states. Second, they argue
that the tax system is inelastic, meaning that
tax receipts do not rise as fast as the state
economy. Finally, they maintain that to
improve the quality of education in
Tennessee more spending and tax revenues
will be necessary. 
This study assesses the wisdom of a state
income tax. The first section examines the
recent budget and tax trends in Tennessee.
We refute the underlying premise of “tax
reform” advocates by showing that
Tennessee’s structural deficit problems are a
result of a huge growth in state expenditures,
not insufficient revenues. Next the study
explores the potential fiscal and economic
impact of introducing an income tax in the
state. We show that the likely effect for the
state would be higher state spending and
lower economic growth. We conclude from
this evidence that of all the options available
to close the state budget deficit, introducing
an income tax in Tennessee would likely be
the single most economically harmful one.
Tennessee derives large economic benefits
from not having an income tax, and it should
not forfeit those benefits.
Finally, we make a series of positive rec-
ommendations about how Tennessee could
improve its fiscal climate. These recommen-
dations include (1) tax and expenditure lim-
its prohibiting the state budget from grow-
ing faster than personal income; (2) voter
approval of any tax increase approved by the
legislature; (3) a two-thirds supermajority
requirement to raise taxes or debt; (4) reform
of the TennCare program, which is the major
source of the budget deficit; and (5) a half-
cent reduction in the state sales tax rate. 
How Tennessee’s Budget
Compares
The Tennessee budget shortfall has been
caused exclusively by excessive spending, not
insufficient revenue gains. To understand
why this is the case, it is helpful to review the
overall fiscal trends in the states and compare
them with those in Tennessee. 
Today, almost without exception, state
governments are awash in tax revenues.
Between 1992 and 1999 state revenues grew
by more than 50 percent.7 If over the period
1992 to 1998 states had restrained their
spending and tax collections to inflation and
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3population growth, the state tax burden
would be $75.2 billion lower today, or $278
less per person.8
The inflation-adjusted figures show that
the states now spend roughly $600 more per
person than they did in 1990. Over the past
four years, two out of every three dollars of
revenue surpluses have been spent on new
and expanded government programs. Only
about one-third of the surpluses has been
returned to taxpayers.9
How does Tennessee fit into this general
national picture of fiscal expansion? On the
one hand, Tennessee remains a low-tax and
low-spending state. Tennessee ranks in the
bottom 10 among the 50 states in almost all
categories of overall tax burden and spending
burden. Taxes and spending are about $1,000
and $650, respectively, per person below the
national average.1 0 This status as a low-tax
state confers large comparative economic
advantage to businesses and residents in the
state. Over the past 10 years, Tennessee has
ranked in the top 10 in almost all measures
of economic health, such as new-business
start-ups in the 1990s. The Small Business
Survival Committee ranks Tennessee as hav-
ing the ninth-best climate for business. It
notes that Tennessee’s low tax burden is one
of the state’s most important business-
friendly policies. The after-tax rate of return
on capital and investment in Tennessee is
one of the highest in the nation.11
However, there are indications that
Tennessee’s comparative advantage on fiscal
policy is slowly eroding. The trend data indi-
cate that in recent years state lawmakers in
Nashville have relied on huge surges in tax
receipts to build up the budget at a rapid pace. 
Since 1990, Tennessee has substantially
outspent other states, and its tax burden has
risen more rapidly than all but a handful of
states (see Tables 1 and 2).
With respect to expenditures, Tennessee
ranks 11th in overall growth of spending
from 1990 to 1997. The national average for
Table 1
Total State Expenditure (millions of 1997 dollars), 1990–97
Increase,
State 1990–97 Rank 1997 Rank 1990 Rank
U.S. Total 27.2% --- $893,827 --- $702,591 ---
Oregon 58.8% 1 $12,388 27 $7,803 29
Texas 52.9% 2 $48,887 3 $31,974 3
Mississippi 51.5% 3 $9,006 31 $5,943 31
Arkansas 48.1% 4 $7,685 32 $5,188 34
Georgia 46.5% 5 $21,975 13 $15,004 14
Idaho 46.1% 6 $3,674 43 $2,515 44
Utah 43.9% 7 $6,818 36 $4,738 37
Nevada 42.6% 8 $5,130 39 $3,598 41
Florida 40.4% 9 $37,464 5 $26,687 8
Missouri 39.1% 10 $14,230 21 $10,229 22
Tennessee 38.4% 11 $14,284 20 $10,323 21
West Virginia 38.1% 12 $7,145 34 $5,174 35
North Carolina 37.9% 13 $22,864 11 $16,576 12
New Mexico 37.7% 14 $7,059 35 $5,125 36
New Hampshire 37.2% 15 $3,324 45 $2,423 46
Sources: Bureau of the Census; and authors’ calculations.
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inflation-adjusted spending growth was 27.2
percent. In Tennessee the budget grew in real
terms by 38.4 percent.
It is true that Tennessee has experienced a
boomlet in population gains over this period,
which accounts for some of the extra spend-
ing—but not all of it. When we adjust for
population growth, we find that per capita
budget growth in Tennessee in the 1990s has
risen 12th fastest of the 50 states.
Taxes, meanwhile, have grown at twice the
rate of population plus inflation over the
period 1992 to 1998. To be precise, from
1992 to 1998 Tennessee revenues rose by 54.5
percent, whereas population and inflation
grew by just 24.7 percent. In 1999 the state
government of Tennessee collected $1.4 bil-
lion more than it would have if tax collections
had been restrained to personal income
growth. If this extra tax collection had been
distributed to the families of Tennessee, the
typical family of four would have received a
$1,000 tax rebate in 1999 (see Table 3). 
The argument has been made by Governor
Sundquist that intergovernmental expendi-
tures account for the large rise in overall expen-
ditures. But that proposition is unsupported by
the data. From 1990 to 1997 total state spend-
ing rose by 70 percent, and total state spending
minus intergovernmental spending rose by 72
percent. Not much difference.1 2
It is sometimes instructive to take a long-
term view of state budget trends to get a his-
torical perspective of state government.
Figure 1 shows that in 1971 state tax collec-
tions equaled $3 billion in inflation-adjusted
terms. By 1998 the budget increased to
around $7 billion. By the next fiscal year,
2001, even without an income tax, the tax
take in Tennessee will climb to $8 billion. In
less than 30 years, the state tax collections
have increased eightfold.
In fact, our analysis shows that Tennessee
has had robust gains in tax collections (11th
fastest in the nation).1 3A state budget deficit
has emerged because those revenue gains have
not been able to keep pace with a decade-long
budgetary expansion. The major source of the
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Figure 1
Tax Revenue, FY71 to FY98
Sources: Bureau of the Census; Center for the Study of the States; and Cato Institute.
spending acceleration has been social services
and health care—two components of spending
that add little value to the economic competi-
tiveness of the state. In particular, TennCare,
the state’s alternative to Medicaid introduced
at the start of this decade, has experienced
rampaging costs, as discussed below. 
Has the Spending Spree
Continued in Recent Years?
All of the above data come from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census state fiscal reports
through 1998. This is the best data available
for making interstate comparisons on taxes
and spending. What about the most recent
Tennessee budgets? Have the trends of exces-
sive taxes and spending continued?
Using the Tennessee Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means committee data we
examined the most up-to-date general fund
figures for the period 1997–2000. We find no
discernible change in the trend of spending
and taxing. In FY98 the budget rose only
slightly. But in 1999 and 2000 Tennessee had
one of the largest increases in expenditures of
any state. Table 4 shows that from 1997 to
2000 state spending rose by 15 percent versus
12 percent growth of population and infla-
tion in Tennessee. Tax collections slightly
outpaced population growth plus inflation
(13 percent versus 12 percent). 
There is some question as to whether the
Tennessee Constitution even allows for this
rapid growth in expenditures. According to
Article 2, Section 8 of the state’s constitution: 
In no year shall the rate of
growth of appropriations from
state tax revenues exceed the esti-
mated rate of growth of the state’s
economy as determined by law. No
appropriation in excess of this limi-
tation shall be made unless the
General Assembly shall, by law con-
Table 2
Per Capita Total State Expenditure (millions of 1997 dollars)
Increase,
State 1990–97 Rank 1997 Rank 1990 Rank
U.S. Total 18.6% --- $3,340 --- $2,817 ---
Mississippi 43.0% 1 $3,298 26 $2,306 41
Oregon 39.9% 2 $3,819 13 $2,730 29
Arkansas 38.2% 3 $3,046 33 $2,204 45
West Virginia 36.3% 4 $3,935 12 $2,887 21
Texas 34.1% 5 $2,515 50 $1,876 50
Missouri 32.0% 6 $2,634 48 $1,995 49
New Hampshire 30.1% 7 $2,834 42 $2,179 46
Nebraska 29.2% 8 $2,898 38 $2,242 44
Pennsylvania 29.0% 9 $3,269 29 $2,533 32
Kentucky 28.1% 10 $3,313 24 $2,586 30
Georgia 27.3% 11 $2,935 37 $2,306 42
Tennessee 26.1% 12 $2,661 47 $2,111 47
Illinois 25.3% 13 $2,968 36 $2,369 39
Florida 24.7% 14 $2,557 49 $2,050 48
Kansas 24.0% 15 $2,889 40 $2,330 40
Sources: Bureau of the Census; and authors’ calculations.
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taining no other subject matter, set
forth the dollar amount and the
rate by which the limit will be
exceeded.
We should also note that there are at least
eight states that are prohibited by law or by
state constitution from spending or taxing
faster than population growth and inflation,
as Tennessee has done throughout the past
decade.1 4
Where Has the Tennessee
Budget Expanded Most?
In Table 5 we present the component
breakdown of the state budget from 1990 to
2000. The data is disturbing from the stand-
point of promoting economic growth
because Tennessee’s budget has inflated in
precisely those areas that provide Tennessee
workers and residents with the least econom-
ic return for their tax dollars. The preponder-
ance of the spending hikes has not been
devoted to schools, roads, bridges, prisons,
and other items that are infrastructure
enhancements—although even those items
of the budget have grown fairly rapidly.
Instead, the inflated areas of budget growth
have been in unproductive income-transfer
spending: health, welfare, government
salaries, and debt service.
The TennCare Time Bomb
TennCare was first introduced in the early
1990s. The program moved the entire
Medicaid system in Tennessee from a tradi-
tional fee-for-service plan to a health mainte-
nance organization plan. Its supporters tout-
ed it as a cost-saving plan. More Tennessee res-
idents would be served, but cost controls
would trim the rapid growth in health care
costs of the 1990s. The program was launched
under the previous governor, Ned McWherter.
Today, the claim that TennCare will save
money for state taxpayers could hardly be
more thoroughly contradicted by the actual
financial results of the program. From the
very outset, TennCare has been crippled by a
raging inflation in its costs. Even as the
national rate of Medicaid expenditure growth
mercifully started to slow, TennCare’s health
care costs accelerated. Cost control features
crumbled as caseloads rose.
Table 6 presents the devastating compara-
tive data between TennCare and nationwide
Medicaid spending. From 1994 through
2000, TennCare’s cost will have risen by 59
percent versus 23 percent for the rest of the
states. If TennCare’s costs had simply grown
at the rate of the national average since 1994,
the state budget would be almost $1 billion
lower in 2000.
This finding has been confirmed by
other analyses. A 1997 study by the Citizens
Table 3
States Saw $75 Billion Revenue Windfall in 1998 (tax revenue figures in millions of dollars)
Actual Actual 1992–98 Est. 1998 1998
Tax Tax Actual 1992–98 1992–98 Population Revenue with 1998 per Capita
Revenue Revenue 1992–98 Population CPI Growth Pop. Growth + Revenue Revenue
1992 1998 Increase Growth Growth + Inflation Inflation Cap Windfall Windfall
U.S. Total $327,822 $476,250 45.3% 6.0% 16.3% 22.3% $401,004 $75,246 $278
Tennessee $4,526 $6,991 54.5% 8.3% 16.3% 24.7% $5,642 $1,349 $248
Sources: Bureau of the Census; Center for the Study of the States; Cato Institute.
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for a Sound Economy Foundation rated the
fiscal health of state Medicaid programs.
Tennessee received a grade of D minus, one
of the five worst in the nation.1 5
One reason that TennCare has been
unable to constrain costs has been the
moral hazard problem associated with free
health care. The lure of free care has created
a stampede of new entrants into the pro-
gram—some dropping their private insur-
ance voluntarily. One result of TennCare
that the Citizens for a Sound Economy
study found was that TennCare has the
highest ratio of recipients to poor people in
the nation.
More recent data on Medicaid and
poverty rates for 1997 and 1998 show that
the trend of TennCare’s financial problems
and overenrollment has deteriorated.
Nationwide about 86 of every 100 poor peo-
ple receive Medicaid. In Tennessee, incredi-
bly, for every 100 poor residents, there are
151 recipients of TennCare (see Figure 2).
In other words, almost one-third of those
receiving TennCare are technically not con-
sidered poor. Another financial problem
saddling the TennCare program includes
massive fraud, such as payments to dead
people and payments to out-of-state resi-
dents.
Even advocates of TennCare concede that
its caseloads have shot up astronomically.
State Comptroller John Morgan recently
stated that there are “over 500,000 Tennes-
seans who would not have been eligible for
Medicaid coverage who enjoy comprehensive
health insurance benefits” under TennCare.16
Simply eliminating the inflated caseloads for
TennCare would single-handedly bring the
budget back into balance—even if no other
corrective fiscal actions were taken.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of total
current state and local direct general expen-
ditures going for the broad category “wel-
fare” in FY96, the last year comprehensive
Census data were reported, including both
state and local governments (the propor-
tion of the welfare function performed at
the local level varies from state to state, so
the appropriate data for comparison pur-
poses should include local government). In
Tennessee, welfare absorbs about a 20 per-
cent larger proportion of total current
expenditures than it does in the rest of the
nation. Also, a larger proportion of the
income of the residents of Tennessee went
to support welfare than was the case
nationwide. The dominant reason for this
is the Tennessee Medicaid program,
TennCare. In Tennessee, the coverage under
this medical assistance program is wildly
out of line with standards nationwide. 
7
Table 4
Tennessee State Budget
1994–2000, 1997–2000,
Population Population
1994–2000, Change + 1997–2000 Change +
FY94 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY 2000* %Change Inflation* % Change Inflation*
Total $12,325,910,200 $14,529,392,000 $14,553,138,200 $15,996,204,990 $16,702,916,460 36% 25% 15% 12%
State 6,226,346,300 7,140,369,900 7,392,089,800 7,987,938,890 8,292,539,160 33% 16%
Federal 3,946,512,900 4,754,841,600 4,900,817,800 5,246,264,700 5,866,777,400 49% 23%
Bonds 361,800,000 524,600,000 135,800,000 352,500,000 137,726,000 -62% -74%
Other 1,791,251,000 2,109,580,500 2,124,430,600 2,409,501,400 2,405,873,900 34% 14%
State Revenue
Total $5,938,158,100 $6,933,501,400 $7,346,687,300 $7,555,600,000 $7,801,300,000 31% 25% 13% 12%
Sources: Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committee Staff, FY94–FY99 Green Book, March 1999, p. 44; and Cato Institute.
* Year 2000 data based on forecast of inflation and Bureau of the Census estimate of population growth.
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Figure 2
Estimated Medicaid Recipients per 100 Poor, 1997–98
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; and
authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3
Welfare as a Percentage of Total Spending: 1996
Source: Bureau of the Census.
Why New Taxes Are Not
Necessary
Governor Sundquist and Tennessee legis-
lators allege that their budgets are rising
because they are facing increased demands to
spend in the 1990s.17 For example, Sundquist
argues that with the renewed emphasis on
states’ rights and federalism under the
Republican Congress, the federal govern-
ment is devolving more spending responsi-
bilities to the states—in such areas as welfare
and criminal justice—without a commensu-
rate increase in resources. 
The truth is, however, that federal spend-
ing on grants to states and localities has been
growing, not falling. Federal grants to state
and local governments did decline in the
1980s, from $155.7 billion in 1980 to $144.7
billion in 1990 after adjusting for inflation—
a reduction of 7.1 percent. Real federal aid
remained level throughout the mid-1980s
and has surged since 1987. From 1990 to
1998, federal aid rose by almost half in real
terms, from $144.7 billion to $215.9 billion.18
So real federal aid is about 40 percent higher
now than it was in 1980.
It is true that there are certain high-prior-
ity areas of Tennessee’s budget where the
public is demanding more funding. One of
those areas is law enforcement. As the public
continues to adopt a “lock ’em up” attitude
toward criminals, Tennessee’s spending on
prisons, police, and the courts has almost
doubled. Tennessee is also under a court-
ordered school financing equity requirement
that has caused education funding to surge.
Yet there are factors that have generated
substantial budgetary savings for states in the
1990s and should be contributing to shrink-
ing state budgets. Most of these factors are
related to the robust U.S. economy. 
The first factor is declining interest rates.
Tennessee is a net borrower on a large scale.
The state borrows to fund highways, school
construction, prisons, and other capital
spending. In 2000 the state paid $262 million
in debt-service costs.1 9But long-term interest
rates over the past six years have fallen by
some 200 basis points. Hence, the cost for
Tennessee to service its debt has fallen in
recent years.
The second factor has been the impact of a
strong economy and welfare reform legisla-
tion on welfare caseloads. Welfare reform has
been an astonishing success story in the states
and at the national level. Following the lead of
the states, the federal government in 1996
adopted work requirements, time limits, and
new eligibility restrictions for welfare benefits.
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Table 5
Categories of Spending in Tennessee State Budget
FY90 FY99 FY 2000 % Change
General government $314,364,900 $599,125,440 $687,716,300 119%
K–12 education 1,628,486,700 2,904,929,300 2,982,357,500 83%
Higher education 1,044,935,100 1,809,891,200 1,906,859,800 82%
Health and social services 2,263,784,100 6,311,688,400 7,079,604,800 213%
Law, safety, and correction 488,692,900 838,562,000 878,132,700 80%
Resources and regulation 224,413,000 470,382,850 624,414,800 178%
Transportation, business,
and economic development 1,101,459,800 1,445,666,100 1,475,061,700 34%
Debt service 120,248,000 271,810,000 262,480,860 118%
Counties and cities 434,700,000 608,400,000 641,800,000 48%
Sources: Tennessee General Assembly Fact Books, FY89–90, FY98–99, and FY99–00.
The result has been that welfare rolls have fall-
en by 42 percent nationwide since 1994.20
Tennessee has been a laggard in this regard
because of programs like TennCare, which
attract new clients. Since welfare is the second-
largest component of the Tennessee budget,
there should have been tens of millions of dol-
lars of expenditure savings from reduced pay-
ments.21 Unfortunately, Tennessee has misal-
located much of those savings into new areas
of spending—such as day care, job training,
and TennCare. 
We should add that welfare remains quite
generous in Tennessee and usually pays more
than a typical starter job.22 A woman with
two children receiving the full array of wel-
fare benefits in Tennessee—including food
stamps, Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families, TennCare, public housing, and util-
ity subsidies—receives the equivalent income
of $6.60 per hour.2 3
A third economic factor benefiting the
states financially has been the steady decline in
unemployment. Each year states spend about
$20 billion on unemployment benefits.24
Today the unemployment rate is at its lowest
level in 20 years, and it is especially low in
Tennessee, where the problem is not a short-
age of jobs but a shortage of workers. The
increase in workers’ payments into unemploy-
ment compensation systems and the decline
in the number of unemployed people drawing
benefits have created huge and in some cases
unprecedented surpluses in state unemploy-
ment insurance trust funds.
Finally, and most importantly, over the
next 25 years, the state of Tennessee will
receive huge payments in the tobacco litiga-
tion settlement. In November 1998, 46 states,
including Tennessee, reached an agreement
with the tobacco industry on a $206 billion
settlement of their suit over the medical treat-
ment costs of smoking-related illnesses.2 5
This massive windfall will provide a steady
stream of extra cash into the state coffers over
the next two decades at least. Ultimately, the
tobacco settlement money should be used to
cut other taxes, such as the overall sales tax.
Clearly, the state does not need to be raising
other taxes at precisely the moment it is
receiving hundreds of millions of dollars a
year from tobacco companies. 
When all of these factors are taken together,
it would be reasonable to expect that
Tennessee’s budget situation would be
strong. Pressures on expenditures are falling.
Revenues are surging. Unfortunately, new
revenues and budgetary savings have simply
helped finance an explosion of expenditures
in other areas of state budgets.
Is a Tennessee Income Tax
Desirable?
One of the lead options for closing the
budget shortfall in Tennessee is to adopt a
personal income tax. Proponents of the state
income tax say that the plan would have sev-
eral positive effects:
1. It would increase state revenue, thus
closing future budget shortfalls.
2. It would help alleviate inequities in the
10
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Table 6
Medicaid versus TennCare
FY94 FY99 FY 2000 % Change
TennCare Expenditures* $2,731,828,998 $4,013,117,200 $4,338,070,000 59%
Total nationwide Medicaid spending $131,000,000,000 $156,000,000,000 $161,000,000,000 23%
Sources: Tennessee General Assembly Fact Books, FY94–95 and FY99–00; and National Association of State Budget Officers.
* TennCare began on January 1, 1994.
business tax structure.
3. It would increase “tax fairness” by plac-
ing a greater share of the tax burden on
wealthier Tennessee residents.
4. It would finance a reduction in the state
sales tax rate, thus reducing lost retail
sales to out-of-state vendors.
But each of these arguments avoids the
central point: Tennessee derives substantial
economic gains from being one of nine
non–income tax states. There is substantial
evidence that if Tennessee were to adopt an
income tax, its growth rate would be lower
than it would be without an income tax. By
reducing economic growth, an income tax
will surely make the tax burden on businesses
heavier, not lighter; it will make the tax struc-
Table 7
1990s Economic Growth in 10 Highest-Tax States and 10 Lowest-Tax States
1990 Real
per Capita Personal Employ-
State Tax Population Income ment
Revenue U.S. Growth U.S. Growth U.S. Growth U.S.
State (1997$) Rank 1990–97 Rank 1990–97 Rank 1990–97 Rank
U.S. Total $1,446 7.3% 16.5% 9.1%
High-Tax States
Alaska $3,435 1 10.2% 13 6.1% 47 15.8% 12
Hawaii $2,578 2 6.7% 23 3.6% 50 3.8% 43
Delaware $2,074 3 9.3% 16 17.3% 21 7.0% 35
Connecticut $1,968 4 -0.6% 49 10.0% 40 -6.0% 50
New York $1,953 5 0.8% 47 7.5% 46 -1.6% 49
Massachusetts $1,913 6 1.7% 43 11.2% 36 3.2% 46
Minnesota $1,910 7 6.8% 21 18.1% 17 11.9% 20
Washington $1,861 8 14.5% 7 25.5% 10 18.0% 7
California $1,782 9 7.8% 18 7.7% 45 4.5% 42
Wyoming $1,657 10 5.8% 28 13.4% 34 6.7% 37
High-Tax States Total 5.5% 9.9% 3.9%
Low-Tax States
New Hampshire $658 50 5.5% 30 15.2% 29 5.6% 40
South Dakota $882 49 5.9% 26 17.9% 18 14.1% 14
Texas $1,061 48 14.0% 8 27.0% 8 15.8% 11
Tennessee $1,066 47 9.8% 15 24.6% 11 13.3% 16
Colorado $1,141 46 17.8% 5 34.3% 3 24.6% 4
Mississippi $1,142 45 5.9% 25 22.8% 13 9.1% 30
Alabama $1,159 44 6.7% 22 18.2% 16 17.3% 8
Nebraska $1,176 43 4.8% 35 15.1% 30 10.9% 24
Arkansas $1,180 42 7.2% 20 21.9% 14 9.5% 29
Missouri $1,184 41 5.4% 33 15.4% 26 13.2% 17
Low-Tax States Total 10.5% 23.7% 14.9%
Sources: Bureau of the Census; and authors’ calculations.
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The negative rela-
tionship between
taxes and growth
at the state level is
still as pro-
nounced as ever.
ture more unfair for the poor because there
will be fewer economic opportunities and
lower after-tax wages; and it will accelerate
state spending, thus perpetuating deficits.
How State Taxes Influence
Economic Growth
There is increasing evidence that state tax
and budget policies can have a significant
effect on the relative economic performance
among states. Studies have consistently
shown that states with high and rising tax
burdens are more likely to suffer through
economic decline, while those with lower and
falling tax burdens are more likely to enjoy
robust economic growth.26 For example, a
1996 study by the Federal Reserve Board of
Atlanta examined state economic perfor-
mance from 1960 to 1992 and found that
“Tax rates [average and marginal] are nega-
tively related to growth and are sufficiently
variable over time to reasonably explain vari-
ations in growth rates.”2 7
A study by the Joint Economic Committee
of Congress examined the economic growth
records in the 10 states that had raised taxes
the most in FY90 through FY93 and the 10
states that had cut taxes the most over that
same period. The top-10 tax-hiking states
experienced a net gain of only 3,000 new jobs,
an increase in the unemployment rate of 2.2
percentage points, and a $484 real decline in
personal income per family of four. In con-
trast, the top-10 tax-cutting states gained
653,000 net new jobs, an increase in the unem-
ployment rate of only 0.6 percentage points,
and a $300 real increase in personal income
per family of four.2 8
The contrast was even greater when only
income tax changes were considered. The
top-10 income tax–hiking states experienced
cumulatively the net loss of 182,000 jobs, a 2.3
percentage point increase in the unemploy-
ment rate, and a $613 real decline in personal
income per family of four. The top-10
income tax–cutting states gained cumula-
tively 975,000 net new jobs, an increase in the
unemployment rate of only 0.3 percentage
points, and a $148 real increase in personal
income per family of four.29 Other studies
have found similar correlations between high
taxes and slow economic growth.
We have updated the 1993 Joint Economic
Committee analysis using Census Bureau data
through 1997. We find that the negative rela-
tionship between taxes and growth at the state
level is still as pronounced as ever. Table 7
shows our findings. The 10 states with the
highest per capita state tax burdens in 1990
experienced economic growth that was at
most half the rate of the 10 states with the
lowest per capita state tax burdens.
• Population growth was 10.5 percent in
the lowest-tax states versus only 5.5 per-
cent in the highest-tax states.
• Real personal income grew by 23.7 per-
cent in the lowest-tax states but by only
9.9 percent in the highest-tax states. 
• Job growth was 14.9 percent in the low-
est-tax states compared to only 3.9 per-
cent in the highest-tax states. 
We also found that state tax hikes are
associated with worsening instead of improv-
ing bond ratings. A comparison of tax-raising
and tax-cutting states in the early 1990s
found that in the tax-cutting states, the aver-
age Moody’s bond rating in 1995 was
between Aaa and Aa. In the tax-raising states,
the average Moody’s bond rating was
between Aa and A1. Moreover, the tax-cut-
ting states had much larger budget reserves
(7.1 percent of state expenditures) than did
the tax-increasing states (1.7 percent).3 0
Because state tax cuts can stimulate eco-
nomic development, whereas state tax hikes
can retard it, revenue growth is often faster
than anticipated in the tax-cutting states and
slower than anticipated in the tax–raising
states. After California’s record $7 billion tax
hike in 1991, actual revenue growth came in
below projections for each of the next three
years. The same was the case in New Jersey.
New York is perhaps the most amazing story
of all. Tax increases in the late 1980s pro-
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duced anemic revenue growth for the state
treasury. But revenues have been climbing so
rapidly since Gov. George Pataki’s tax cuts in
1995 that according to the Empire
Foundation, a New York taxpayer watchdog
group, “Even when the final and deepest
phase of New York’s income cut was imple-
mented [in 1997], the state’s resurgent econ-
omy generated more income tax revenue
under Gov. George Pataki than it ever did
under former Gov. Mario Cuomo.”3 1
While sales taxation is directed at con-
sumption, income taxation is directed at
output, since incomes are created in the
production of output. One sure legal way to
avoid income taxes is to be unproductive,
that is, to stop earning income. Another
legal means of tax avoidance is to move out
of the state. Thus states with high income
taxes will have less productive activity
inside their borders, as individuals reduce
work effort or move. 
Migration patterns across states confirm
the theory: Americans do move from high- to
low-tax states in very large numbers. From
April 1, 1990, through June 30, 1998, on net
2,686,958 native born Americans moved
from the 41 states that had comprehensive
individual income taxes to the nine states,
including Tennessee, that did not.32 People
voted with their feet to leave the jurisdictions
that taxed their productive activities for
those places that did not—at a rate of 38 per
hour, every hour, day and night, for over
eight years.
Economic theory suggests that the impo-
sition of an income tax in Tennessee would
also promote capital flight. The reduction in
labor supply implicit in the out-migration of
population, other things equal, will tend to
increase market-wage rates, raising the cost
of doing business and ultimately squeezing
profit margins for firms competing in inter-
state commerce. Consider a pilot who is con-
templating taking a job at Federal Express in
Memphis at $70,000 annually. Before the
income tax, he considers that sum reasonable
compensation and agrees to go to work for
FedEx. Suppose, however, that a 5 percent
income tax is imposed. After some exemp-
tions and deductions, that tax exacts a $2,000
net cost on the pilot (whose federal tax liabil-
ity will also fall somewhat because of
deductibility of state income taxes against
the federal tax). At the margin, the imposi-
tion of the tax makes the position less attrac-
tive at a salary of $70,000, and he declines the
offer. Only by increasing the salary to, say,
$73,000, can FedEx obtain the needed pilot,
raising labor costs in this example by about 4
percent. A personal income tax will raise
labor costs for Tennessee businesses, increas-
ing incentives to move elsewhere or not to
locate in Tennessee.
Case Study: Tennessee versus Kentucky
The impact that taxes have on economic
growth is perhaps most vividly seen by look-
ing at the experience of Tennessee and its
neighbors. Of the Volunteer State’s eight
neighbors, Kentucky has the longest border
and is probably the state most similar to
Tennessee in most respects, including, histor-
ically at least, economically. For example, in
1980, per capita income in the two states dif-
fered by only eight dollars (0.1 percent).
One way in which Kentucky deviates
markedly from Tennessee, however, is in tax
policy. In 1980 state and local taxes as a per-
cent of personal income were about 10 per-
cent higher in Kentucky than in Tennessee,
with the critical difference being that
Kentucky levied a personal income tax and
Tennessee did not. From 1980 to 1996,
Tennessee maintained its low-tax climate,
with taxes as a percent of personal income
actually falling slightly. By contrast,
Kentucky went in the opposite direction:
taxes rose more than in any of the nine states
bordering Tennessee (including Tennessee).
Kentucky’s income tax burden expanded
enormously. By 1996 taxes per $1,000 in per-
sonal income were $117.29 in Kentucky but
only $90.42 in Tennessee. The Kentucky tax
burden was nearly 30 percent higher than in
the Volunteer State.
What happened to the economies of the
two states? Both grew, but Tennessee’s per-
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centage growth in real output per capita was
more than one-third larger than Kentucky’s
(see Figure 4). Whereas in 1998 dollars
Tennessee’s income per capita was a minus-
cule $16 higher than in 1980, by 1998 the
income disparity had grown to $2,064. It
now takes the typical Kentuckian 13 months
to make the income that a resident of
Tennessee makes in a year. 
For two reasons, Kentucky’s income tax
was a key factor in its relative stagnation.
First, as stated above, dollar for dollar,
income taxes are worse than other taxes,
since they are a direct burden on produc-
tion and income. Second, over time, income
tax revenues typically rise faster than
incomes, so the overall tax burden tends to
rise automatically in states relying on
income taxes, unlike with states where
sales, property, and other forms of taxation
dominate. Since, dollar for dollar, private
sector activity is more efficient and growth-
inducing than public sector spending, the
effect of income taxes’ increasing the size of
the public sector also retards economic
growth in the long run.
The Impact of Income Taxes
on State Budgets
One almost certain impact of a state
income tax in Tennessee will be to further
accelerate the rise in the state budget. Income
tax enthusiasts have even admitted that an
income tax is necessary to fund some $582
million in new program expansions in the
2000–2001 state budget.3 3
A landmark study by economist Thomas
Dye of Florida State University has docu-
mented that when states introduce an
income tax, the impact has been almost uni-
form.3 4First, governmental expenditures rise
dramatically; second, the overall tax burden
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“The unanimous
conclusion is that
there is no con-
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school funding
and school per-
formance.”
rises (i.e., income taxes are never full substi-
tutes for other taxes); and third, the econom-
ic growth rate of the state falls. 
Taxes and Schools
One rationale for the state income tax is
that it will fund more and better schools in
Tennessee. It is understandable that politi-
cians are sensitive to this argument. Public
opinion polls consistently show that educa-
tion is a top priority in our society. But the
reality is that there is no evidence that high-
er funding leads to better schools.35 If more
money were the answer to improving edu-
cation, then the highest-spending states
would have the finest education systems in
the land and the lowest-spending states
would be performing poorly. But Tennessee
officials who believe that increased educa-
tion funding is the solution to better
school performance may be interested to
learn that in 1997 the 10 highest-spending
states spent twice as much as the 10 lowest-
spending states, but average SAT scores in
the more frugal states were 16 percent higher
than in the big-spending states.36
There is no debate that America’s
schools need to do a better job of educating
our children if the nation is to remain inter-
nationally competitive in the next century.
Spending more money on the public
schools, however, has been tried in earnest
for decades, and it has yielded at best mixed
results. As education analysts John Chubb
and Terry Moe of the Brookings Institution
have noted: “As for money, the relationship
between it and effective schools has been
studied to death. The unanimous conclu-
sion is that there is no connection between
school funding and school performance.”3 7
The famous Kansas City school experi-
ment of the 1980s and 1990s tells a cautionary
tale to education officials in Tennessee who
believe that deluging schools with money will
magically lead to better performance. Kansas
City spent $2 billion to improve its public
schools, raising per pupil expenditures to
$11,700, but after 10 years found almost no
achievement-based results. In fact, after 10
years of this massive infusion of funds, test
scores continued to fall, and white flight from
the inner-city schools accelerated.3 8
Tennessee has been repeating this exper-
iment with the same unpromising results.
Table 8 shows that the passage of the Basic
Education Program (BEP) in Tennessee in
1992, designed to increase school-financ-
ing equity, has led to a more than $1 billion
increase in state spending on K–12 schools
over the past eight years.3 9There is no truth
to the claim that school funding is being
shortchanged in Tennessee.
New solutions, including choice in educa-
tion, charter schools, teacher pay for perfor-
mance, and ending tenure to get rid of bad
teachers, would seem to be much more
promising ways for improving the Tennessee
schools than simply writing larger checks to
an ailing public school system.
Policy Recommendations
A Tennessee personal income tax appears
Table 8
The Growth of the Basic Education Program
FY90 FY99 FY 2000 % Change
K–12 education $1,628,486,700 $2,904,929,300 $2,982,357,500 83%
Sources: Tennessee General Assembly Fact Books, FY89–90, FY98–99, and FY99–00.
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highly inadvisable to us on both fiscal and
economic grounds. The result will be slower
growth and higher government spending. So
what positive steps should be taken to
improve the tax system in Tennessee?
1. Adopt tax and expenditure limitation
measures. These measures should by law
restrain tax collections and spending
increases to personal income growth in
the state. The evidence suggests that
states with tax and expenditure limita-
tions have done a better job restraining
state government growth than states
without such disciplining measures.4 0
California, Colorado, Missouri, and
Washington each have constitutional
tax limitations that restrict the growth
of revenues to the rate of population
growth plus inflation. These states gen-
erally require that any revenue in excess
of that amount be rebated to the peo-
ple. For example, in 1997 Colorado
rebated $140 million in tax revenues to
taxpayers, while Missouri gave back
$318 million in rebate tax credits.41
A Tennessee tax and expenditure
limitation should require the state leg-
islature to rebate excess tax collections
to Tennessee families and businesses
on a pro-rata basis at the end of each
fiscal year.
2. Reform TennCare: The program is
bankrupting the state with stampeding
costs and the most inflated enrollment
of any Medicaid program in the nation.
Tennessee should return to convention-
al Medicaid coverage and reimburse
only for essential medical services. If
TennCare cannot be dismantled for
political reasons, the only way to
restrain costs is to cap overall expendi-
tures and place a ceiling on overall
enrollment. 
3. Reduce corporate welfare spending. The
state of Tennessee now spends nearly
$1.5 billion a year on “economic devel-
opment.” Some of those activities, such
as transportation improvements may be
necessary. But others, as in the area of
special spending concessions for busi-
nesses, are unnecessary. The best eco-
nomic development program for
Tennessee is its lack of an income tax. 
4. Freeze state government hiring and
salaries. In the 1990s Tennessee has had
the 13th-largest increase in state-local
government employment. Meanwhile,
state government compensation is at
least 20 percent higher than what is
paid to comparably skilled private sec-
tor workers.4 2A salary and hiring freeze,
until the budget crisis is over, would
allow private sector compensation to
“catch up” with the compensation paid
to government workers. 
5. Reserve the tobacco litigation settlement
money for closing the budget shortfall,
not for new spending. Tennessee is
scheduled to receive hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars over the next 25 years in
lawsuit funds from the tobacco compa-
nies. This revenue windfall should pro-
vide ample funds to help balance the
budget without any new taxes. 
6. Require a supermajority vote to raise
taxes. Thirteen states, including Arizona,
California, and Nevada, have adopted
measures requiring that any tax increase
by the legislature must pass by a super-
majority vote in both houses. Most
require a two-thirds vote, but others
require three-fourths or three-fifths.
Those measures have been highly effec-
tive at deterring routine tax increases
during nonemergencies.43 Supermajority
requirements are most effective when
they are applied to all tax increases—
whether they apply to income taxes, busi-
ness taxes, sales taxes, or excise taxes. 
7. Reduce the sales tax by at least one-half
of 1 percent. Tennessee loses retail sales
because of cross-border activity. On this
point almost all participants in the tax
reform debate agree. If the recommen-
dations in this analysis were adopted, a
surplus would emerge large enough to
begin lowering the state sales tax. The
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“static” revenue loss will not be equal to
the actual revenue impact of this tax
rate reduction. Some of the reduction in
tax revenues from a lower rate will be
recouped through increased retail sales.
Conclusion
Despite Governor Sundquist’s claims
that his administration has been fiscally
conservative, the truth is that the budget
crisis in Tennessee is a result of steady and
ultimately unsustainable budget increases
over the past decade. In the 1990s the state
budget has grown by roughly 75 percent in
nominal terms and by about 45 percent in
real terms. The spending acceleration has
been particularly pronounced in recent
years, even as budget deficits loomed on the
horizon. Tax collections have increased at a
robust pace—in fact, a pace that most other
states would be very pleased if they could
equal. If tax collections had grown only at
the pace of population growth plus infla-
tion (as is required by law in many states),
the average Tennessee family of four would
have paid $1,000 less in state taxes in 1999.
Clearly, more revenues—through an
income tax or any new redesigned tax sys-
tem—will do little to reinstall fiscal disci-
pline in Nashville. What is needed is a series
of fiscal reforms aimed at slowing future
expenditures.
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